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Tushnet: The Possibility of Illiberal Constitutionalism?

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Mark Tushnet*
Abstract
This Essay examines the possibility of an illiberal constitutionalism
in which some citizens have “second-class” status – protected against
arbitrary government action but with restricted rights. Drawing on
scholarship dealing with “dual states” and federalism, the Essay
argues that illiberal constitutionalism is possible conceptually but may
be quite difficult to sustain over time in the face of the openness of even
illiberal polities to demographic and similar changes.
The revival of interest in comparative constitutional law over the
past generation or so was provoked in substantial part by the transition
from authoritarian rule to liberal constitutionalism in Latin America,
Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa.1 This shift may have
dichotomized the conceptual space for comparison between liberal
constitutionalism and authoritarianism. Even the proliferating literature
on “adjectival constitutionalism” seems to deal mostly with varieties of
liberal constitutionalism.2 In recent work, studies of abusive
constitutionalism deal with the use of the forms made available within
liberal constitutions that enable a transition from liberal
constitutionalism (back to) authoritarianism.3
This Essay begins an exploration of an alternative to both liberal
constitutionalism and authoritarianism, in an attempt to discover
whether we can expand the conceptual space for comparative
*

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. An earlier version
of this Essay was presented as the Dunwody Lecture at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law. I thank the Florida Law Review for inviting me to deliver the lecture, and Brian Bix, Jill
Goldenpine, Madhav Khosla, David Law, Gila Stopler, and Gerald Torres for comments on a
draft of this Essay. An oral comment by Dieter Grimm reinforced their observation that the
category of illiberal constitutionalism had to be defined in a way that distinguished it from the
rule of law, and this version attempts to do so. This Essay is my first effort in a larger project
examining the possibility of illiberal constitutionalism. A subsequent Essay will address
moderately theocratic constitutional systems.
1. Cf. David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the
Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 46 (2011) (referring to the events of 1989 as influencing the
revival of interest in comparative constitutional law).
2. Mark Tushnet, Editorial, Varieties of Constitutionalism, 14 INT’L J. CON. L. 1, 1
(2016).
3. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013); see
also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 870–71
(2013).
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constitutionalism.4 It does not take the position that illiberal
constitutionalism, were it possible, would be normatively attractive, but
only that there might be systems worth studying that are
constitutionalist but not liberal.5 This Essay begins with several
observations about the project, all of which have the effect of
emphasizing the question mark in the Essay’s title—that is, it may be
that the conceptual space actually can only be dichotomized into liberal
constitutionalism and authoritarianism, with no possibility of illiberal
constitutionalism.6
First, what is liberal constitutionalism? For the purpose of this
Essay, it refers to a set of political principles with two components.7
Liberalism assumes the equality of all people—or, for present purposes,
the equality of all citizens.8 In addition, it assumes, in political
4. There is a literature on illiberal democracy, which deals with polities in which voters
freely choose policies that are inconsistent with liberal commitments along some dimensions.
See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 1, 1997),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy. That literature is
relevant to this inquiry, but only indirectly, because illiberal democracies generate illiberal
outcomes without taking illiberal principles as a foundation of their constitutionalism. Put
another way, critics of an illiberal policy generated in an illiberal democracy can point to
principles embedded in the nation’s constitution as the basis for arguing that the policies are
unconstitutional. Such arguments would be unavailable in illiberal constitutional systems,
because the illiberal principles are themselves embedded in the constitution. In an earlier work, I
examined what I called “authoritarian constitutionalism,” which at the time of writing I
considered a system committed to principles like free and fair elections and freedom of
expression, but with sufficient restrictions on the implementation of those principles to place
them near the low end of the range of liberal constitutionalism. See Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian
Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 393, 396 (2015). On the idea of a range of liberal
constitutionalism, see infra text accompanying notes 7–10.
5. This Essay uses stylized examples rather than real-world ones to define the conceptual
terrain. It should be noted that some national constitutions may approach illiberalism; these
include Hungary and (controversially) Israel.
6. The difficulty in even figuring out what illiberal constitutionalism might look like
suggests that it might in fact not be possible.
7. I suspect that on further reflection I will conclude that the two components are
actually versions of a single principle. For example, political philosopher Charles Taylor
describes illiberalism as the majority saying to the minority, “Your view is not as valuable, in
the eyes of this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots.” CHARLES TAYLOR,
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 57 (1994) (emphasis added).
Here, the minority is not equal, and it is not equal because of the priority the polity gives to a
specific view of the good. Id.
8. Restricting the component to “citizens” raises questions about the principles of
immigration policy a liberal polity must adhere to. This Essay is not the place for a full
discussion, but it appears that most liberal constitutionalists adhere to the view, associated with
Professor Joseph Carens, that liberalism in principle requires open borders, and that that
requirement can be compromised for contingent, mostly political reasons, such as the risk that
open borders will flood social welfare states with immigrants, and concern that too-rapid rates
of immigration and the sometimes-associated cultural change will disrupt the stability of the
nation’s commitment to liberalism. For overviews, see generally JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS
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philosopher John Rawls’s terms, the priority of the right over the good,
ruling out the possibility that a liberal state could be committed to more
types of perfectionism.9 This Essay focuses on the first component. The
illiberal polities this Essay will discuss reject the equality premise,
where “equality” refers to something like “equality with respect to
aspects of being a person that are relevant to governance.”10
Second, what is constitutionalism? Sometimes one runs across
relatively “thick” definitions of constitutionalism. Such definitions build
liberalism into the definition: A system is a constitutional one only if it
robustly protects civil liberties such as freedom of expression, for
example. Such a definition of constitutionalism would rule out the
possibility of illiberal constitutionalism at the outset. For some
purposes, of course, doing so is perfectly sensible, but this Essay cannot
do so (if it did, it would end here).
There is another difficulty with equating constitutionalism with
liberal constitutionalism. Consider the following polities: the United
States before the adoption of the Nineteenth (women’s suffrage)
Amendment, the United States between the end of the Civil War and the
civil rights era of the twentieth century, and the United States today.
Should those polities be considered non-liberal because (in order)
women lacked the right to vote, African-Americans were effectively
denied the right to vote, and African-Americans are denied civic
equality along many dimensions? If we do consider them non-liberal,
liberal constitutionalism becomes something like an aspiration or a
goal—again, a perfectly acceptable account for some purposes, but not
helpful in assessing whether real polities are liberal constitutionalist
ones or not.11 Perhaps, though, one could contrast aspirational liberal
constitutionalism with illiberal constitutionalism by showing that
illiberal constitutionalism abandons one or more of the aspirations of
liberal constitutionalism; perhaps the inquiry this Essay pursues might
be understood in those terms.
Without liberalism built into the definition of constitutionalism, this
Essay’s inquiry requires some independent definition of
IMMIGRATION (2013) (discussing the practical problems immigration poses on Western
democracies); Rainer Bauböck, Migration and Citizenship: Normative Debates, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 594–613 (Marc R. Rosenblum &
Daniel J. Tichenor eds., 2012). Related but somewhat different questions arise in connection
with long-term resident noncitizens, and in particular guest workers. Again, those questions are
outside the scope of this Essay, but I hope to say something about them in the larger project.
9. John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251,
252 (1988).
10. This is the meaning of the principle in the Declaration of Independence, that “all men
are created equal.”
11. It might be helpful if supplemented by some metric by which one could assess the
degree to which polities fell short of the aspiration to “full” liberal constitutionalism.
OF
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constitutionalism. At present, and pending further reflection, this Essay
defines constitutionalism as requiring, first, that government officials
not act arbitrarily; or, seen from the other side, constitutionalism
requires that officials act pursuant to some general principle. Again, this
must be qualified. No system can guarantee complete compliance with
its regulative principles, so no matter what sometimes officials will act
arbitrarily. We need some idea of what I have elsewhere called
“shortfalls,” failures of compliance that are sufficiently isolated or
infrequent that they do not undermine the claim that the system is
constitutionalist.12 In addition, a shortfall exists when a system fails to
live up to its aspirations—fails fully to implement a policy that it
acknowledges as normatively valuable. Rejection of one or more liberal
rights in principle is not a shortfall.13
Legal philosopher Lon Fuller famously offered an extremely thin
definition of the rule of law, as requiring eight attributes: generality,
publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, and practicability, with
some degree of stability over time and with relatively few shortfalls.14 If
we define constitutionalism as no more than non-arbitrariness, it may be
no different from the “mere” rule of law.
Beyond the “mere” rule of law, constitutionalism may require what
this Essay calls “thin” constitutionalism. Such a constitutionalism
preserves some space for civil society and, concomitantly, offers some
protection to expression. Further, government decisions are rooted in a
process that is in some sense consultative, whether through elections or
other methods of ascertaining the public’s preferences. In that sense,
thin constitutionalism rests on the consent of the people.

12. For the language of shortfalls, see ANTONI ABAT I NINET & MARK TUSHNET, THE
ARAB SPRING: AN ESSAY ON REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 (2015).
13. Can shortfalls within a constitutionalist system be systematic, for example,
concentrated on a distinct subpopulation in the country? The answer is likely “no”: A nation
with systematic arbitrariness as to a subpopulation is either an illiberal constitutional nation or
an authoritarian one.
14. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 (1969). Some, and perhaps Fuller
himself, believe that a system that satisfies Fuller’s eight criteria will (almost) inevitably satisfy
thicker requirements associated with liberalism.
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Finally, what is the possibility of illiberal constitutionalism? My
observation that liberal constitutionalism might be an aspirational ideal
suggests that illiberal constitutionalism is similarly aspirational, though
of course in the other direction. And, as this Essay’s treatment of
aspirational liberal constitutionalism suggests, there should be some
real-world––rather than purely conceptual––ways of identifying these
systems. And, in the real world, illiberal constitutionalism may be
possible if illiberal systems persist or are relatively stable over some
reasonable period, a period comparable to the length of time over which
liberal constitutional systems persist or are relatively stable.15
With all these preliminaries out of the way, I offer a sketch of a
polity in which illiberalism might be sensible and non-arbitrary.
Consider a polity with several ethnic or religious groups. One group
has, say, fifty-five percent of the population, another twenty-five
percent, and the third twenty percent; the second group holds a slight
majority of the nation’s wealth, and the third has strong ties with a
relatively wealthy diaspora. These groups have frequently been in
violent conflict. For contingent historical reasons, the three groups
cannot separate into distinct nations; they must somehow exist within a
single polity. Realizing that achieving civil peace is a great value,16 they
agree to a constitution dividing power among them. The peace pact they
reach shares political power equally among all three groups, the hope
being that the two minority groups’ access to different sources of wealth
will bring material prosperity. The national constitution dividing power
is illiberal because not all citizens are treated equally with respect to
political power: A vote cast by a member of the majority group counts
less than a vote cast by a member of either minority group. On the face
of things, this is not an obviously unattractive arrangement.17
This Essay leaves this possibility aside for now, returning to it at the
conclusion, and turns to a substantially less attractive example: a polity
in which ethnonationalism is constitutive. Suppose, then, that Hungary
defines itself in its constitution as a nation for people of Hungarian
ethnicity. Those of other ethnicities—such as Polish or Romany—are

15. The period for liberal constitutionalism is almost certainly longer than the well-known
“nineteen years” as the average duration of national constitutions, because that figure includes
the large number of cases in which one liberal constitution replaces a prior liberal constitution.
For the figure, see ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2
(2009).
16. That realization underlies the Hobbesian–Lockean account of liberal
constitutionalism. See Steven Forde, John Locke and the Natural Law and Natural Rights
Tradition, NAT. L., NAT. RTS., & AM. CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011), http://www.nlnrac.org/
earlymodern/locke.
17. For a discussion of whether the arrangement can be stable, see infra pp. 1381–82.
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second-class citizens of Hungary. Can such a polity be constitutionalist
even though it is illiberal in denying the equality of all citizens?18
This Essay approaches that question from two directions: from
underneath, so to speak, by examining how some obviously illiberal
systems deal with the existence of second-class citizenship in a nonconstitutionalist way, and then from above, using federalism as a way of
thinking about the possibility of systemic unequal treatment.
The émigré scholar Ernst Fraenkel described Nazi Germany as a
“dual state.”19 He observed that large swathes of law were administered
in a straightforward way, completely compliant with the requirements
of the rule of law. For example, disputes over ordinary commercial
contracts between “Aryan” Germans or property disputes among them
were handled by the courts in a way indistinguishable from how they
had dealt with similar disputes in the years before the Nazis took power.
But, he also noted, there was another “legal” system, dealing with
disputes involving Jews and other non-Aryans. In that—the “dual”—
system, the stated legal rules, those satisfying the rule of law, went out
the window. So, for example, in a commercial dispute between an
Aryan and a Jew, the court would utterly disregard the clear language of
a contract provision if that language pointed to a legal victory of the Jew
and find in favor of the Aryan. The outcomes were arbitrary from the
point of view of the rule of law, though of course they were completely
predictable.
In a dual state, we find first- and second-class citizens, with the
dividing line drawn by ethnonationalism. Aryans in Nazi Germany and
whites in apartheid South Africa were first-class citizens, entitled to the
full complement of liberal rights and the other attributes of liberal
constitutionalism, including, importantly, freedom of speech and
freedom of movement.20 In contrast, the second-class citizens—nonAryans in Germany and what were known as coloureds in South
18. This Essay puts to one side systems like the Ottoman one in which citizens are subject
to different rules of personal law (especially family law) depending on their religious affiliation
or ethnicity. Problems of boundary drawing do arise in such systems as a result of intermarriage
and other forms of what this Essay describes as porosity, but the limited domain of the special
rules distinguishes them from the systems of interest in this Essay.
19. ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF
DICTATORSHIP 46 (1941). Fraenkel’s analysis was later applied to apartheid South Africa by
sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 101 (1967) (describing “herrenvolk democracy”), and political
scientist Jens Meierhenrich, JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–2000 (2008).
20. MEIERHENRICH, supra note 19, at 1652–2000. As the Essay discusses below in
connection with federalism, issues can arise about the content of specific liberal freedoms, but
the key is that first-class citizens enjoy rights specified in ways that keep the specifications
within the range available in liberalism.
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Africa—were subject to purely arbitrary governance. The dual state
described by Fraenkel is illiberal but not constitutionalist because the
second-class citizens are subject to arbitrary governance because the
law as applied has no relation to the stated law.
For my purposes, then, I modify the concept to investigate a (quasi)
dual state in which the first-class citizens get full liberal
constitutionalism, and in particular rather robust freedoms, and the
second-class citizens get rule-of-law and thin constitutionalism.
Consider a stylized account of contemporary Hungary, which is at least
moving in the direction of ethnonationalism. Assume that ethnic
Hungarians are the first-class citizens, and Hungarians of Polish ethnic
origin are the second-class citizens. A Hungarian of Polish ethnicity is
the tenant of an ethnic Hungarian, and they get into an ordinary
landlord–tenant dispute. The existing law favors the tenant on a
dispositive issue. The dispute is resolved favorably to the tenant. But,
immediately, the government modifies landlord–tenant law on the issue.
The new law does not single out Hungarians of Polish ethnicity for
special treatment, for that would be incompatible with the rule of law.
Rather, the new law’s provisions, while facially neutral as to ethnicity,
have, and are known to have, a substantially disproportionate adverse
impact on tenants of Polish ethnicity without having a similar impact on
ethnic Hungarian tenants. Or, the new law leaves room for executive
and judicial discretion in enforcement and interpretation, which will
predictability be exercised against the disfavored group.21 Hungary, on
this account—again, quite stylized—is a quasi-dual state in which
ethnic Hungarians get liberal constitutionalism and Hungarians of
Polish ethnicity get rule-of-law constitutionalism. On these definitions,
Hungary is an illiberal constitutionalist state.
But, of course, this is a stylized and therefore imaginary state. Could
it be realized in practice? In practice, a quasi-dual state may well run
into serious problems of stability, of movement from a quasi-dual state
to a true dual state and so from illiberal constitutionalism to illiberalism
without constitutionalism.22
21. Thanks to Professor Brian Bix for suggesting this formulation.
22. There might be difficulties of implementation as well. For example, in the example of
the landlord–tenant dispute developed in the text, will it be possible for the government’s
lawyers to devise new provisions in the law of tenancy that have the necessary disparate effect?
Implementation difficulties of this sort could be overcome by talented (though of course a- or
immoral) lawyers, at least often enough to keep the system within the bounds of
constitutionalism. There may be other kinds of implementation difficulties that “good”
lawyering cannot overcome. And, perhaps an illiberal constitutionalist regime will be unable to
recruit enough “good” lawyers to keep it from degenerating into a non-constitutionalist one.
Roughly, the thought is, the regime will find itself saying, in effect, that it is too difficult to
sustain constitutionalism so it might as well abandon constitutionalism and become a true dual
state.
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Consider initially the second-class citizens. One can imagine that
they would not be a source of a substantial threat to the regime’s
stability. They might be substantially outnumbered, so that political
resistance is, so to speak, futile, and they might lack access to the
resources needed to mount a successful campaign of violent resistance.
Further, the benefits they receive from rule-of-law and thin
constitutionalism, and in particular the regularity accompanying the rule
of law, may be enough to suppress high levels of resistance by the
second-class citizens. They might resign themselves to a world in which
they are badly treated if the bad treatment is predictable.23
Next, what of the first-class citizens? They might benefit materially
and psychologically from the system, but some of them might want to
use their liberal freedoms in ways that could lead to instability.
Consider freedom of speech. Some first-class citizens may want to use
that freedom to agitate for the elimination of the quasi-dual state and
illiberal constitutionalism and for replacing it with liberal
constitutionalism. The abstract right of free expression can be specified,
within liberalism, in ways that give the government some resources to
deploy against these agitators. For example, for long periods it was
thought compatible with a liberal idea of free expression for the
government to be authorized to punish speech that had a tendency to
lead to social disorder.24 And, even under more stringent verbal tests
social circumstances might be such that an illiberal quasi-dual state
could plausibly claim, for example, that agitation for the elimination of
second-class citizenship was, under prevailing social conditions, highly
likely to lead to serious violence in the short run—that is, that the
government could show that it could indeed satisfy an only slightly
modified version of a test requiring “imminent lawless action.”25 At
some point, though, the regime might have to deploy illiberal forms of
suppression, including violence and departures from the rule of law,
against first-class citizen dissidents to cut off a threat to its persistence.
23. There are many accounts of adaptations of this type by African-Americans to the
American system of apartheid—segregation by law—particularly in connection with what might
be called the routine activities of daily life such as shopping and transportation. As suggested
earlier, though, it might well be that that system was illiberal and nonconstitutionalist because
arbitrary treatment of African-Americans was so pervasive as to dominate the domains in which
African-Americans were subject to rule-of-law constitutionalism.
24. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (using the language of
“clear and present danger” but applying it in a way that makes clear that the test actually is one
of “tendency”).
25. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The watering-down occurs by
eliminating the requirement that the agitator’s words be words of incitement. But, scholars have
raised important questions about the coherence of that requirement in circumstances where
seemingly innocuous words have the effect of incitement. See, e.g., G. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 19 (2d ed. 2003).
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At that point, again illiberal constitutionalism would become
illiberalism without constitutionalism.26
Another implementation problem for the quasi-dual state’s stability
arises from difficulties in maintaining the boundary between the firstclass and the second-class citizens. That boundary can be physical, as in
segregation and apartheid, and conceptual, in the identification of who
exactly is a first-class citizen.
As political philosopher Charles Taylor puts it, liberal polities are
“porous.”27 Specifically, people move into them and have relations
outside them. What could the illiberal constitutionalism regime do in the
face of porosity, and in particular in the face of movements by the firstclass citizens “outside” their privileged position? Geographic separation
can help maintain stability, but it poses its own problems, in particular,
by reducing the costs of organizing resistance within the community of
second-class citizens. And, often, the first-class citizens will either need
or find it convenient to employ the second-class citizens; think here of
an analogy to the “guest workers” in many nations.28 In these and other
settings, the first- and second-class citizens will have social interactions.
Some of these interactions will reinforce the division, but some might
undermine it. The facts of Loving v. Virginia29 are illustrative.30 Richard
Loving, a white construction worker, and Mildred Jeter, a woman of
African-American and Native American descent, grew up in a small
town in Virginia during the segregation era.31 They met and fell in
love.32 They married in nearby Washington, D.C., then returned to
Virginia, where they were arrested for violating that state’s law against
racial intermarriage.33 These facts show how porosity interacts with the
line between first- and second-class citizens. And, more important for
present purposes, they show how efforts to maintain the line between
first- and second-class citizenship lead to restrictions on the liberal
constitutional rights of the first-class citizens, here the right to choose
who one marries.
26. The South African example suggests that all of what I have written about the quasidual state might be true of Fraenkel’s dual state as well. The pure dual state can maintain control
of the second-class citizens through terroristic repressions, but some first-class citizens might
reject that policy, and the dual state might be able to meet the threat they pose by depriving them
of some of their liberal constitutional rights.
27. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 63.
28. Typically guest workers are non-citizens, but the practice does include some workers
who are or become citizens.
29. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
30. Id. at 2–7.
31. Richard Loving, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/richard-loving110716 (last updated Nov. 10, 2016).
32. Id.
33. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2–3.
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These facts illustrate a more general difficulty with an illiberal
constitutionalism dividing the citizenry into one group with full liberal
rights and another with mere rule-of-law and thin constitutional
protections: Maintaining the boundary between the two classes will
require that the first-class citizens surrender some of their liberal
constitutional rights.34 Perhaps, though, we might still treat the system
as one of illiberal constitutionalism because the first-class citizens,
though they do not enjoy the full panoply of liberal constitutional rights,
enjoy enough of those rights. They are not subject to the systematic
arbitrariness that makes a system non-constitutionalist, and they have
enough liberal rights to make the system different from one in which
everyone is subject only to rule-of-law constitutionalism.
Porosity leads to another difficulty for the type of illiberal
constitutionalism under consideration. The system must be able to sort
people into the two categories of first- and second-class citizens. So, for
example, in the stylized example of Hungary, one has to know who
counts as an ethnic Hungarian. Consider a person whose grandparents
were concededly ethnic Hungarians but whose mother married an ethnic
Serb or Pole or German. Is such a person an ethnic Hungarian, and
therefore a first-class citizen, or not? The categories’ existence requires
something like Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws.35 And, as those laws
show, the definitional features in rules allocating people to the two
categories will inevitably have important arbitrary features: Suppose
that, like the Nuremberg Laws, the (imagined) Hungarian laws define
ethnic Hungarians as those with four ethnic Hungarian grandparents.
That definition seems quite arbitrary when applied to a person with
three ethnic Hungarian grandparents and one Serbian one, who has
always lived as an ethnic Hungarian, or to a person with one ethnic
Hungarian parent and one Serbian parent who is fully assimilated into
the ethnic Hungarian community. In short, there is arbitrariness at the
heart of the illiberal regime—in the very definitions on which the
system rests––and that arbitrariness undermines its claim to be
constitutionalist.
So, although one can imagine an illiberal constitutionalism as a
modified dual state, in which there are permanent second-class citizens
who receive rule-of-law constitutionalism, there appear to be good
34. Nor will it be possible for the system’s defenders to argue persuasively that the way in
which the right is restricted—here, the right to marry—lies within the range of permissible
liberal specifications of the abstract right.
35. See Richard D. Heideman, Legalizing Hate: The Significance of the Nuremberg Laws
and the Post-War Nuremberg Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 5, 5 (2017). See also
Ann Coulter (@AnnCoulter), TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2016, 10:42 PM), https://twitter.com/
anncoulter/status/795833821501460480?lang=en (“If only people with at least 4 grandparents
born in America were voting, Trump would win in a 50-state landslide.”).
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reasons to think that such a constitutionalism could not be stable over
the medium to long run. Depending on how stringent the requirement of
stability for a reasonable period is, this might show that illiberal
constitutionalism is (or is not) possible.
This Essay turns now to the second approach to illiberal
constitutionalism, from the top, where the analogy is to federalism. A
key characteristic of some forms of federalism is that citizens of a single
nation enjoy different sets of liberal rights depending on where they
happen to live. This is not to say that they enjoy different rights
described at a reasonably high level of abstraction. So, again to use a
stylized example, people who live in Rio de Janeiro have a right to
freedom of expression, as do people who live in Brasilia. But the rights
they have differ in their specifications. Importantly, there are alternative
reasonable specifications of essentially all liberal rights, specifications
compatible with the liberal premise that all people are equal in all
respects relevant to governance.36 If one believes, as some do,37 that
laws restricting the distribution of hate speech are compatible with that
premise, if Brasilia has a law banning hate speech and Rio de Janeiro
does not, people in Brasilia have a right to free speech that is different
from the right that people in Rio de Janeiro do.38 To revert to the
language already used in this Essay, as people in Rio de Janeiro see it,
people in Brasilia are second-class citizens of Brazil because they have
fewer rights than “Cariocas” do.39
United States constitutional history provides a real-world example.
Constitutional doctrine from the 1920s to the early 1960s held that first
some, then most of the substantive guarantees of the first eight
amendments—the Bill of Rights—were applicable to the states by

36. There might be some rights, which might be described as absolute rights, as to which
there are no alternative reasonable specifications. The main candidate would be the right not to
be subjected to torture. The argument drawn from federalism that this Essay makes would not be
affected by the existence of a relatively small number of such rights.
37. A shorthand defense of that belief: Many political systems that seem unarguably
liberal have laws against hate speech, and such laws are defensible within liberal premises in the
sense that the reasons for them, and in particular reasons drawn from ideas about promoting or
maintaining social equality, are compatible with those premises even if, on balance, one thinks
that the liberal reasons against such laws are stronger than the liberal reasons for them. For a
recent liberal defense of some laws regulating hate speech, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN
HATE SPEECH 3–4 (2012).
38. If the reader disagrees with the author about hate speech laws, there are a host of other
examples—regulations of sexually explicit material or of demonstrations in public places—that
could make this point.
39. “Carioca” is the word used to describe a resident of Rio de Janeiro. Carioca,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009).
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operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.40 But,
until the late 1960s states could comply with the Constitution with
varying specifications of the applicable protections. Palko v.
Connecticut,41 for example, dealt with a statute authorizing the
government to appeal from an acquittal in a criminal case where, the
government claimed, the jury had received mistaken instructions about
the applicable law.42 The defendant challenged the statute’s
constitutionality, asserting that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.43
That assertion rested on cases holding that the federal government could
not appeal acquittals based upon a claim of mistaken jury instructions,
because, the cases said, such appeals were barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.44 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Palko’s challenge,
saying that the Due Process Clause, the relevant constitutional
provision, guaranteed only those rights that were “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”45 Importantly, other states could interpret
the double-jeopardy ban as prohibiting government appeals in criminal
cases. As Justice John Marshall Harlan put it, under the Court’s socalled “selective incorporation” doctrine, Bill of Rights guarantees were
not applied to the states “jot-for-jot” as they were applied to the national
government.46
In federal systems, then, people in one location can enjoy different
sets of specified liberal rights.47 Now consider all possible abstract
liberal rights: Each can be specified in numerous ways. Some
specifications provide greater protection than others, though all
specifications are compatible with liberalism: hate speech laws or no
hate speech laws, interpretation of equality provisions as ensuring only
40. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (involving an unconstitutional
search), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931) (involving free speech or free press).
41. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
42. Id. at 320–21.
43. Id. at 321.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 325.
46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Duncan,
Justice Harlan criticized the Court for insisting on jot-for-jot incorporation, which, he accurately
said, was inconsistent with the approach taken in Palko and its successors. Id.; see also Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explicitly contrasting jot-for-jot
incorporation with Palko).
47. A comment on a draft of this Essay by Professor Gerald Torres pointed out that the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012) might provide another
example of a class of citizens entitled, within subnational jurisdictions, to a less robust set of
rights than citizens elsewhere. The Act provides that Indian tribes “exercising powers of selfgovernment” must respect a list of rights similar to but not as comprehensive as the national Bill
of Rights. Id. § 1301. The example might be contentious because of questions about the relation
between Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign governments and the U.S. government.
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formal equality or as ensuring substantive equality, and the like.
Further, we can probably array the different specifications of each right
on a scale ranging from strong or “full” protection to weak protection.
Suppose that one subnational jurisdiction chooses to specify all the
liberal rights in ways that lie at the low end of each scale. It has laws
against hate speech and laws against the dissemination of lies, it allows
appeals of acquittals, and so on through the list of liberal rights. By
assumption each of those specifications is consistent with the liberal
premise of equality of all persons. For that reason, I find it difficult to
conclude that this subnational jurisdiction is illiberal. Yet, when we
look at the nation as a whole, we see a large number of people who
enjoy a wider range of rights than those in the “low-end” jurisdiction.
From the national perspective, one might say, as a first cut, that the
people in the low-end jurisdiction are second-class citizens vis-à-vis
those in the rest of the nation. If so, a federal system of this sort might
be described as one in which not all citizens are treated as equals in
respect of governance, and so as an illiberal constitutional system:
illiberal because of the inequality, but constitutional because all citizens
enjoy liberal rights at some level of specification.48
The Essay now introduces some qualifications and complications.
The first is reasonably obvious, but may not be that important for the
overall inquiry. In the prior example, Hungarians of non-Hungarian
ethnic origin are permanently confined to second-class citizenship but
citizens of the low-end jurisdiction are not similarly confined because
they can move elsewhere in the nation.49 If the possibility of exit is
always an answer to the possibility of second-class citizenship, it may
be quite difficult to find examples of illiberal systems. People who are
not ethnic Hungarians can “self-deport” (rather than be ethnically
cleansed through force).50 If people self-deport because they do not like
the low level of rights they have, even though rights at that level are
consistent with liberal premises, we may end up with a state in which
the vast majority of people are full, first-class citizens and the secondclass citizens have decided that, all things considered, having that status
48. To forestall the objection that the “low end” rights affect only local matters and so do
not disadvantage the citizens of the low-end jurisdiction vis-à-vis those in high-end ones,
consider the example of hate speech regulation applicable to some matters on the national policy
agenda. Citizens in the high-end jurisdiction may say some things that citizens in the low-end
one cannot, and as a result might have greater influence on shaping national policy. For
additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 49–52.
49. On standard accounts of federalism, this “exit” option places some constraints on each
subnational jurisdiction’s choices. In particular, the availability of high-end jurisdictions might
induce jurisdictions initially at the low end to adopt more protective specifications of liberal
rights.
50. An illiberal system’s attempt to prevent exit may exacerbate tensions between the
community of second-class citizens and the first-class ones, thereby undermining stability.
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is better than moving elsewhere. That might be a stable illiberal
constitutional system.51 This seems to be the most likely form of stable
illiberal constitutionalism.
A second qualification is that people in the low-end jurisdiction are
not second-class citizens vis-à-vis each other. Everyone within that
jurisdiction has the same low level of rights.52 What, though, of a single
polity within which some citizens have their liberal rights specified at a
high level and others have them specified at a lower level (though,
again, at a level that is defensible within liberalism)? Suppose, for
example, that in my stylized Hungary, acquittals of ethnic Hungarians
cannot be appealed because of double jeopardy concerns but acquittals
of ethnic Poles can be appealed (and both groups otherwise have
identical rights in criminal proceedings). This is almost by definition
illiberal because of the discrimination. But, at least at present, I am
inclined to think that it is constitutionalist because the content of the
low-level rule allowing appeals is consistent with constitutionalism.
Again in a stylized version, Quebec provides a more consequential
example. In a province with a substantial majority of Francophones,
English is a disfavored language.53 Signs must be predominantly in
French, and education policy is structured to channel children into
Francophone schools.54 The purpose and effect of these policies is to
show that Quebec has a preferred class of citizens, the Francophones,
and another, one might say second, class of citizens, the Anglophones.
As in the Hungarian “example” of criminal procedure rights, in this
example everyone has the same set of liberal rights within a wide range,
but not with respect to rights that have some relation to maintaining
Quebec’s Francophone identity. Importantly, Anglophones participate
fully in the province’s local politics on a one-person, one-vote basis.
And they have full free speech rights. They can, for example, advocate
for abandoning the province’s pro-Francophone policies, though of
course they are (or would be, if they bothered to try) predictably
outvoted when questions of provincial identity are put to a vote.
Should we treat this version of Quebec as an illiberal system because
of its language policy? Note that the language policy is not a shortfall,
because the province rejects equality among citizens without regard to
their language as a matter of principle. And it is not an isolated
51. Cf. Anna Stilz, Guestworkers and Second-Class Citizenship, 29 POL’Y & SOC’Y 295
(2010) (arguing that some restrictions on the rights of guestworkers may be morally
permissible).
52. As the preceding paragraph dealing with exit suggests, they might be said to have
chosen to have their rights specified at a low level.
53. See Rebelling Against Quebec’s ‘Language Police,’ BBC: NEWS (May 7, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22408248.
54. See id.
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aberration or unfortunate deviation from liberal equality that persists
because of historical accident. Rather, the language policy is
constitutive of Quebec’s political identity. Yet, because Anglophones
have the opportunity to persuade their co-citizens that the language
policy should be abandoned, and there is nothing in the constitutional
structure that precludes them from succeeding, I am inclined to think
that the province is not illiberal: It is open to changing even its
constitutive identity through political mechanisms fully compatible with
liberalism, and the fact that change is unlikely results from the
preferences of Francophone voters, which might change.
A final case is more difficult. Here the national ethnic identity is
protected by the constitution. That is, under the constitution as it
presently exists, the government is required to take steps to sustain the
national identity. So, for example, the Preamble to Hungary’s 2011
Constitution reads: “We commit ourselves to cherishing and preserving
our heritage, our unique language, the Hungarian culture . . . . We
honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour
the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of
Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation.”55 The constitution
does have provisions dealing with amendment, but, to ensure that the
case remains a difficult one, assume that the constitutional provisions
dealing with national identity are understood, within the nation’s legal
culture, to be part of the constitution’s “basic structure,” and for that
reason cannot be amended within the constitution’s own framework.56
Assume, in addition, that Hungary’s free speech guarantee is
interpreted as making it permissible––and perhaps even required, in
light of the phrase “preserve and nurture”—to prohibit advocacy of
policies that have a tendency to undermine the Hungarian character of
the state. Liberal constitutional accounts of free speech have converged
on the conclusion that the free speech principle makes it impermissible
to prohibit speech simply because it has a bad tendency. 57 So, the “bad
tendency” provision is not within the range of permissible specifications
of the liberal right—it is illiberal. Those who are not ethnic Hungarians
are irremediably relegated to second-class status by the nation’s
55. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] Apr. 25,
2011, pmbl. The reference to the “Holy Crown” is, within Hungarian culture, an important
pointer to the way in which the Preamble describes Hungarian ethnicity as constitutive of
national identity.
56. See generally YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS:
THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017) (explaining the recent comprehensive treatment of
unamendable constitutional provisions).
57. In my view (which is probably an outlier among scholars), that convergence still
leaves room for invoking a “bad tendency” test where a polity is a highly contentious one, with
peace among contending factions quite fragile. But, for purposes of this Essay, assume that the
stylized Hungary is not such a polity.
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constitutive commitments. But, again, if we assume that they receive
rule-of-law and thin constitutional protections in all other domains, then
the Hungary described here may be an illiberal constitutionalist system.
To this point this Essay has described several ways in which an
illiberal constitutionalism might have first- and second-class citizens.
The next question is whether these illiberal constitutionalist systems can
be stable enough. The problem here arises once again from porosity, but
it takes a somewhat different form than it did earlier because the core
illiberalism implicates limitations on freedom of expression. We can
assume that Hungary’s second-class citizens would prefer that the
nation abandon its constitutive commitment to Hungarian ethnicity. But,
on these assumptions, they cannot express that preference because of
the laws restricting freedom of expression; indeed those laws are what
make the system illiberal. But, what about ethnic Hungarians who are,
so to speak, cosmopolitans? They reject in principle the proposition that
any nation can permissibly have a constitutive commitment to
ethnonationalism. Cosmopolitans too are going to be subject to
punishment for advocating cosmopolitanism, because that advocacy has
the prohibited bad tendency. The analogy to the problem for illiberal
constitutionalism illustrated by Loving v. Virginia should be clear.58 The
system’s illiberalism cannot be contained with the group of second-class
citizens. At some point, the regime may have to revert to mere rule-oflaw constitutionalism for all of its opponents to defend, in the regime’s
eyes, the nation’s constitutive identity. Yet, the line between an illiberal
constitutionalism that subjects second-class citizens and the regime’s
opponents to the rule of law and thin constitutionalism, and
authoritarianism seems to be thin indeed.59 Still, if the line, though thin,
can be drawn, perhaps a system in which a regime’s supporters have
liberal rights and its opponents have rule-of-law and thin constitutional
protections might be constitutionalist.
Another source of porosity is external. Illiberalism will meet with
some opposition on the international scene.60 To continue with this
stylized example, the Polish government is not going to be happy about
the treatment of ethnic Poles in an ethno-nationalist Hungary. It will use
the standard tools of international relations—sanctions, shaming,
recruiting other nations into a coalition of opposition—to put pressure
58. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
59. Another source of instability might flow from the psychology of leadership in illiberal
regimes. “Illiberal” leaders might well have authoritarian impulses, and, frustrated when they
come close to the line between illiberal constitutionalism and authoritarianism, may simply
choose to breach the line.
60. “Some” opposition, but not universal opposition. Authoritarian regimes will not
oppose illiberal ones because of their illiberalism, though of course they may oppose them for
other reasons. And, leaders of illiberal regimes will almost certainly see each other as worthy of
support.
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on Hungary. These external pressures might push the illiberal regime
away from its illiberalism, perhaps toward liberalism, but perhaps
toward authoritarianism. Still, the target nation might be able to resist
those pressures. And perhaps the illiberal nation is so insignificant in
international terms that no outsiders care enough to do anything about
the nation’s departures from liberal constitutionalism. So, though
external pressure might undermine an illiberal constitutionalist regime,
that regime might persist for long enough to be counted as stable.
This Essay concludes by returning to the scenario offered earlier of a
society divided among three groups, each of which has greater access
than the others to different resources important for governance: votes,
local wealth, and wealth from the diaspora. At the time of its creation,
the illiberal constitution’s allocation of power works effectively to
preserve peace among the groups. The difficulty, if it is one, is that all
three sets of resources can change (another example of porosity). Rates
of population growth among the groups may vary; locally generated
wealth and inputs from the diaspora may increase or decrease. In some
configurations these changes may revive the tensions that the
constitution initially resolved. So, for example, the constitution gives
less power to the group with the largest numbers than would a “one
person, one vote” system. If that group’s population grows quite a bit
more quickly than the populations in the other groups, the illiberal
allocation of voting power may come to seem increasingly unfair—and
particularly so if the resources the other groups brought to the table
decrease. A large drop in contributions from the diaspora might make it
seem increasingly unfair that the third group has political power equal
to that of the first and second. We can readily imagine other
configurations with similar destabilizing effects.
Which components of the “peace pact” constitution change, and
even whether any do, is of course an empirical question. So is whether
the array of forces—again, votes and material resources generated
locally and from the diaspora—changes in a way that leads some
citizens to rethink the constitutional arrangements. And, finally, so is
whether citizens will conclude that undoing the peace-pact constitution
in light of these changes is worth the risk that violent conflict will
revive. If the contingencies happen to fall out in the right way, the
illiberal constitution would be stable enough. Once again, then, this
Essay concludes that a stable-enough illiberal constitutionalism is
possible, though once again the odds are against it.
This Essay is a first foray into what has proven to be quite difficult
terrain for me, and I expect to revise my thinking as I explore other
facets of illiberal constitutionalism. Consistent with the question mark
in this Essay’s title, the conclusion is quite tentative: At present it seems
that the form of illiberal constitutionalism in which one group of
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citizens receives substantial liberal rights, and another receives rule-oflaw and thin constitutional protection against arbitrary treatment but
nothing more, is a theoretically available possibility. And, under some
conditions such an illiberal constitutionalism might be at least as stable
as liberal constitutionalist systems have shown themselves to be.
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